The Balanced Ideological Antipathy Model: Explaining the Effects of Ideological Attitudes on Intergroup Antipathy across the Political Spectrum

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Abstract

We introduce the balanced ideological antipathy (BIA) model, which challenges assumptions that RWA and SDO predict intergroup antipathy per se. Rather, the effects of RWA and SDO on antipathy should depend on the target’s political orientation and political objectives, the specific components of RWA, and the type of antipathy expressed. Consistent with the model, two studies (N = 585) showed that the Traditionalism component of RWA positively and negatively predicted both political intolerance and prejudice toward tradition-threatening and -reaffirming groups, respectively, whereas SDO positively and negatively predicted prejudice (and to some extent political intolerance) toward hierarchy-attenuating and -enhancing groups, respectively. Critically, the Conservatism component of RWA positively predicted political intolerance (but not prejudice) toward each type of target group, suggesting it captures the anti-democratic impulse at the heart of authoritarianism. Recommendations for future research on the relationship between ideological attitudes and intergroup antipathy are discussed.

Keywords: right-wing authoritarianism; social dominance orientation; prejudice; political intolerance; political psychology
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The role of authoritarianism in predicting prejudiced and anti-democratic attitudes has been the focus of empirical study for over half a century (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954; Stouffer, 1955), and continues to intrigue psychologists and political scientists around the world (e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Funke, 2005; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Stenner, 2005). The authoritarianism identified by Adorno et al. (1950) was a decidedly right-wing phenomenon (Suedfeld, 2002), and that emphasis remains today in the literally thousands of studies of right-wing authoritarianism (Todosijevic’ & Enyedi, 2008), and the ubiquity of Altemeyer’s (1996) right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale for its measurement (Feldman, 2001, p. 971). Over the years, RWA has been shown to powerfully predict prejudice (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008 for a review) and political intolerance (Altemeyer, 1996; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014a; Duckitt & Farre, 1994) toward a variety of groups.

In this paper, we provide evidence that in some ways challenges these conclusions, and in other ways provides nuanced support for them. We build and test the Balanced Ideological Antipathy (BIA) Model, which considers multiple factors that influence the relationship between ideological attitudes (such as RWA) and intergroup antipathy. In doing so, we integrate insights from recent developments in understanding the role of political orientation in intergroup antipathy (a term we use to refer to both prejudice and political intolerance), the multidimensionality of ideological attitudes, and the measurement of authoritarianism itself.

The Complex Relationship between Political Orientation and Intergroup Antipathy
Like right-wing authoritarianism, political conservatism (which is strongly correlated with RWA; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) has been linked to antipathy toward a variety of groups, including but not limited to African-Americans (Sears & Henry, 2003), gay men and lesbians (Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2010), and immigrants (Hodson & Costello, 2007). However, the conclusion that there is a “prejudice gap” (Chambers, Schlenker, & Collison, 2013) between liberals and conservatives is challenged by several recent studies from multiple independent labs. Instead of relying mostly or exclusively on left-wing targets of antipathy, as was customary in the extant literature, these studies examined prejudice, political intolerance, and discrimination toward target groups from across the political spectrum (Chambers et al., 2013; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014b; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013). Across convenience and representative samples, conservatives’ antipathy toward left-wing or left-aligned groups (e.g., atheists, poor people) was equivalent to liberals’ antipathy toward right-wing or right-aligned groups (e.g., Evangelical Christians, wealthy people). Summarizing this evidence, Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, and Wetherell (2014) posited the ideological conflict hypothesis (ICH), which argues that intergroup antipathy is not the exclusive province of the political right. Rather, people across the political spectrum express antipathy toward ideologically dissimilar groups largely because these groups threaten their values and beliefs (Crawford, 2014; Wetherell et al., 2013).

Evidence supporting the ICH raises the question of whether RWA is the universally powerful predictor of intergroup antipathy as suggested by the extant literature, or whether like conservatism, its effects on prejudice depend on the target’s political orientation. The limited available evidence favors the latter possibility. Chambers et al. (2013) found that whereas RWA positively related to prejudice against left-wing groups, it negatively related to prejudice against
right-wing groups. Further, Crawford and Xhambazi (2015) showed that whereas RWA positively related to political intolerance of Occupy Wall Street protestors, it negatively related to political intolerance of Tea Party protestors.

To date, however, the question of whether target political orientation moderates the effects of RWA on prejudice has not been systematically explored. Further, strong evidence indicates that ideological attitudes are best understood as being expressed along two related but distinct dimensions: one captured by RWA, and the other captured by social dominance orientation (SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), which expresses the motive to promote existing status hierarchies in order to maintain intergroup dominance and superiority. According to the dual-process motivational (DPM) model of ideological attitudes (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010), RWA captures ideological beliefs characterized by social conservatism and traditionalism vs. individual freedom and autonomy, whereas SDO captures beliefs characterized by economic conservatism, group dominance and power vs. egalitarianism.

Whereas RWA and SDO are often related to each other, they have different consequences for intergroup attitudes. According to the differential prediction hypothesis of the DPM model (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010), RWA predicts prejudice against groups who threaten societal traditions or collective security (e.g., gay men and lesbians, drug dealers), whereas SDO predicts prejudice against low status groups and groups who threaten to attenuate existing status hierarchies (e.g., unemployed people, housewives; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). Recently, Crawford and Pilanski (2014a) found that consistent with extant findings that authoritarianism is strongly associated with anti-democratic sentiment (Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005), RWA was associated with political intolerance of groups who endorse
social tradition-threatening policies\(^1\) (e.g., pro-choice; pro-gay rights) as well as groups who endorse hierarchy-attenuating policies (e.g., pro-welfare; pro-health care reform). Further, despite evidence to the contrary (Altemeyer, 1998; Feldman, 2003), SDO was associated with political intolerance over and above the effects of RWA, but only toward hierarchy-attenuating groups.

Of course, like most other tests of the DPM model, Crawford and Pilanski (2014a) failed to include right-wing corollaries of tradition-threatening and hierarchy-attenuating groups—that is, tradition-reaffirming and hierarchy-enhancing groups. There is scattered evidence that RWA and/or SDO are negatively associated with antipathy toward right-wing targets generally (Chambers et al., 2013; Crawford & Xhambazi, 2015), and that RWA is negatively associated antipathy toward tradition-reaffirming political candidates (Crawford, Brady, Pilanski, & Erny, 2013) while SDO is negatively associated with antipathy toward hierarchy-enhancing targets (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). That said, differential prediction (i.e., testing effects of one ideological attitude dimension while controlling for effects of the other) of attitudes toward right-wing targets has yet to be adequately tested. Thus, the political objectives (i.e., tradition- or hierarchy-related) of the target should impact which ideological attitude dimension (i.e., RWA or SDO) most strongly predicts intergroup antipathy. Critically, whereas the DPM model is one of the more influential models of ideological attitudes and intergroup antipathy, it does not account for antipathy expressed toward right-wing groups, at least in its present form. One of the primary aims of the BIA model is to remedy this limitation.

**Measuring Authoritarianism**

\(^1\)Crawford and Pilanski (2014a) used the term “cohesion-reducing;” in the present paper, we instead use the term “tradition-threatening” because perceived threats to social cohesion depend on the political context.
Altemeyer (1996) developed the RWA scale to capture three inter-related attitudinal clusters: authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism. Although Altemeyer’s RWA scale was a clear psychometric improvement upon the original F-scale (Adorno et al., 1950; see Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010 for a discussion), psychometric problems with the RWA scale have also been noted, such that many individual scale items capture two or sometimes even all three of these attitudinal clusters (Duckitt et al., 2010; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Funke, 2005; Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010), and that primarily authoritarian aggression items are worded in the pro-trait direction, whereas primarily conventionalism items are worded in the con-trait direction (Mavor et al., 2010). These psychometric issues have hindered the ability to discretely measure RWA’s three individual components.

To remedy these psychometric and conceptual problems, Duckitt et al. (2010) developed the Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism (ACT) scale, which captures three distinct components of right-wing authoritarianism: Authoritarianism, which assesses punitiveness vs. leniency; Conservatism, which assesses obedience vs. rebelliousness; and Traditionalism, which assesses conformity vs. nonconformity to social norms, values, and morality (These dimensions are respectively analogous to the attitudinal clusters Altemeyer identified as authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism). Evidence from multiple samples and labs indicates that these components capture distinct political and intergroup attitudes. For example, over and above the other components, Authoritarianism is associated with attitudes regarding military action and punishment of lawbreakers (Crawford et al., 2013; Duckitt et al., 2010), Conservatism is associated with deferential attitudes and behavioral intentions towards authority figures and hostile attitudes and behavioral intentions toward protestors and dissident
groups (Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013; Duckitt et al., 2010), and Traditionalism is associated with religiosity and socially conservative attitudes on a range of issues, such as gay rights (Crawford et al., 2013; Duckitt et al., 2010).

This recent development in the measurement of RWA may help disentangle the relationship between ideological attitudes and intergroup antipathy. First, specific components of RWA may have differential consequences for two different types of intergroup antipathy: prejudice and political intolerance. Prejudice refers to negative evaluations of or feelings toward particular social groups and their individual members (Allport, 1954; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010), whereas political intolerance refers to the willingness to deny certain social groups democratically-guaranteed rights, such as the freedom to speak publicly regarding their beliefs or to organize in order to influence policy (see Sullivan & Transue, 1999 for a review). Although these two types of antipathy are related to each other they have differential bases in moral convictions, such that at least in Western cultural contexts, moral convictions are related to prejudice but not political intolerance (Skitka, Liu, Yang, Chen, Liu, & Xu, 2013). They also have different threat-based antecedents: Crawford (2014) recently found that prejudice against political activist groups derives from abstract threats to values and beliefs rather than more tangible threats (e.g., security and safety; protection of the rights of others), whereas political intolerance toward these same targets derives from more tangible than abstract threats.

In their work validating the ACT scale, Duckitt and colleagues (2010; 2013) found that Conservatism, which captures submission to authority, was associated with positive and negative behavioral intentions toward authorities and dissidents, respectively. What distinguishes prejudice from political intolerance is the behavioral intention involved—it is one thing to dislike a group (i.e., prejudice), but a step beyond that to express willingness to deny such a group its
rights (i.e., political intolerance; see Crawford, 2014 and Skitka et al., 2013 for similar arguments). Thus, we expect Conservatism to uniquely capture the willingness to endorse actual restrictions on political activists, and thus expect it to predict political intolerance, but not prejudice, against political activist groups.

Importantly, we suggest that Conservatism will positively predict political intolerance regardless of the target’s political orientation (i.e., left-wing or right-wing). Both those on the left and right defer to authorities, so long as those authorities share their values (Frimer, Gaucher, & Schaefer, 2014). Thus, we propose that Conservatism captures the anti-democratic impulse—a general predisposition towards anti-democratic sentiment long considered the root of authoritarianism. In fact, in one of its earliest formulations, the authoritarian personality was referred to as the “anti-democratic personality” (Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1947), and some scholars have even used the RWA scale as an indicator of political intolerance (Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005).

On the other hand, the Traditionalism component captures one’s orientation toward traditional vs. progressive values. Thus, it should capture the content of tradition-related ideological motives, with Traditionalism positively predicting antipathy toward tradition-threatening activist groups, but negatively toward tradition-reaffirming activist groups. Thus, whereas Conservatism should positively predict political intolerance (but not prejudice) regardless of target political orientation, the effects of Traditionalism on both political intolerance and prejudice should depend on the target’s political orientation. Such effects should hold for both political intolerance and prejudice judgments because the target’s political objectives regarding traditional vs. progressive values are evident in both types of judgments.
Such evidence would comport with findings that RWA positively and negatively relates to political intolerance of Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party protestors, respectively (Crawford & Xhambazi, 2015), as well as evidence that Traditionalism captures opposition to pro-gay candidates and support for anti-gay candidates (Crawford et al., 2013). Importantly, it would also show that “right-wing” authoritarianism and anti-democratic sentiment are not synonymous (as argued by Stenner, 2005), as low scores on the Traditionalism component of RWA would predict anti-democratic sentiment toward tradition-reaffirming (i.e., right-wing) groups. Such evidence would also strongly indicate the necessity of conceptualizing authoritarianism multi-dimensionally, as one component of RWA (i.e., Conservatism) would positively predict political intolerance of tradition-reaffirming groups, whereas another component of RWA (i.e., Traditionalism) would negatively predict political intolerance of these same groups, and may ultimately explain why RWA has been positively associated with political intolerance in general (e.g., Stenner), yet also negatively associated with political intolerance of right-wing groups (Crawford & Xhambazi, 2015).

Of course, one could consider the prediction that Traditionalism should be related to people’s attitudes toward target groups who advocate for traditional vs. progressive political outcomes as tautological. This potential tautology in measurement of predictor and outcome measures is reflected throughout the RWA literature, in that some items from the RWA scale mention the types of groups often under study (see Mavor, MacLeod, Boal, & Louis, 2009; Whitley & Lee, 2000 for discussions). Indeed, some researchers have simply dropped the conventionalism/Traditionalism component measures from the RWA scale itself when examining attitudes toward social groups (e.g., Johnson, LaBouff, Rowatt, Patock-Peckham, & Carlisle, 2012). Yet, our predicted effects of Traditionalism would bolster one of the primary
aims of the BIA model itself—to separate the RWA component that captures “authentic”
authoritarian attitudes and behavior such as anti-democratic sentiment (i.e., Conservatism) from
a component less related to authoritarianism per se, and more dependent on the target’s political
orientation and objective (i.e., Traditionalism).

Because SDO captures ideological motives to enhance or attenuate existing status
hierarchies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), its effects on antipathy should also depend on target
political orientation, such that SDO should positively predict antipathy toward hierarchy-
attenuating targets but negatively toward hierarchy-enhancing targets. As with Traditionalism,
these effects should be observed on both political intolerance and prejudice judgments, as the
targets’ political objectives are evident in both types of judgments.

The BIA Model

Relying on the evidence reviewed above, we introduce and test the balanced ideological
antipathy (BIA) model, which predicts the effects of ideological attitudes on intergroup antipathy
by considering five factors: 1) the ideological attitude dimension of the perceiver (i.e., RWA vs.
SDO); 2) the component of RWA (i.e., Authoritarianism, Conservatism, Traditionalism); 3) the
ideological orientation of the target (i.e., left-wing vs. right-wing); 4) the political objectives of
the target (i.e., tradition-related vs. hierarchy-related); and 5) the type of intergroup antipathy
(i.e., political intolerance vs. prejudice). Figure 1 summarizes the model’s predictions. First,
Conservatism should predict political intolerance regardless of the target’s political orientation
(left or right) or political objective (tradition- or hierarchy-related), but should be unrelated to
prejudice. Effects of Traditionalism and SDO on both forms of intergroup antipathy should
depend on both the target’s ideological orientation and political objectives. Specifically,
Traditionalism should positively predict antipathy toward tradition-threatening targets and
negatively predict antipathy toward tradition-reaffirming targets, but should be unrelated to antipathy toward hierarchy-related targets. Further, SDO should positively predict antipathy toward hierarchy-attenuating targets and negatively predict antipathy toward hierarchy-enhancing targets, but should be unrelated to antipathy toward tradition-related targets. These differential prediction effects are partially derived from the DPM model (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). That said, whereas the DPM model can account for these predictions regarding tradition-threatening and hierarchy-attenuating groups, it does not make predictions regarding tradition-reaffirming or hierarchy-enhancing groups.

The Authoritarianism component of RWA is related to prejudice against physically dangerous groups (Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013). Because we focused on relatively mundane rather than extremist or violent groups (e.g., terrorists), we did not expect Authoritarianism to predict prejudice or political intolerance over and above Conservatism, Traditionalism, and SDO. However, we test effects of the Authoritarianism component in all reported analyses.

Support for the BIA model would challenge some long-standing conclusions regarding the relationship between ideological attitudes and intergroup antipathy, but also provide nuanced support for others. Specifically, the model’s predictions strongly challenge the conclusion that RWA and SDO predict prejudice per se; rather, like political conservatism (Brandt et al., 2014), effects of Traditionalism (a component of RWA) and SDO on prejudice should depend on the target’s political orientation. That said, the model’s prediction that Conservatism will predict political intolerance regardless of target political orientation or political objective is consistent with the long-standing conclusion that the anti-democratic impulse is at heart of the authoritarian disposition. Importantly, however, such a finding would identify the specific ideological component of authoritarianism that does so, significantly advancing scholarship on people’s
obedience to authority and their willingness to suppress dissident groups. At the same time, however, if effects of Traditionalism (also long considered part of the authoritarian syndrome; Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt et al., 2010) on political intolerance depend on the target’s political orientation, this would strongly challenge the idea that “right-wing” authoritarianism predicts political intolerance per se (Altemeyer, 1996; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014a; Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005), and would indicate that the Traditionalism component simply captures ideological orientation, not “authentic” authoritarian attitudes or behaviors.

We conducted two studies testing the BIA model’s hypotheses. As in Crawford (2014), participants completed both political intolerance and prejudice judgments toward political activist groups. Using political activist groups as targets provides a more controlled test of the psychological distinction between political intolerance and prejudice (and the ideological attitude components associated with them) than using non-political social groups (e.g., African-Americans; atheists). Specifically, political intolerance judgments necessarily give political meaning to non-political social groups, whereas prejudice judgments (e.g., feeling thermometer or social distance ratings) do not necessarily give political meaning to these groups. Using political activist groups as targets reduces the chance of such a potential confound because political activist group’s political meaning is apparent in both political intolerance and prejudice judgments.

**Study 1**

Study 1 tested the BIA model’s hypotheses in a between-subjects design in which participants were randomly assigned to evaluate either six left-wing or six right-wing groups. This “content-controlled” method is in line with other recent political intolerance research (Crawford, 2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014b), and has several advantages over the traditional
“least-liked groups” approach (e.g., Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995), such as drawing comparisons between politically opposing targets, examining multiple targets rather than only a single target, and providing a more accurate estimate of the prejudice-political intolerance relationship (see Crawford, 2014 for a detailed discussion).

Method

Participants

Three hundred thirty-three U.S. residents (49% female; 58% White; M_age = 36 years) were recruited through Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online labor market in which well-established findings in social psychology and political science have been replicated (e.g., Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011). Interested individuals selected a link to the online survey and were compensated 50 cents for their participation.

Materials and Procedures

Participants first completed the 36-item ACT scale (Duckitt et al., 2010) comprised of three 12-item subscales measuring Authoritarianism (e.g., “What our country really needs is a tough, harsh dose of law and order”), Conservatism (e.g., “Our country will be great if we show respect for authority and obey our leaders”), and Traditionalism (e.g., “It is important that we preserve our traditional values and moral standards”), as well as a 16-item SDO scale (Ho et al., 2012; e.g., “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups”). Both ACT and SDO scales and their respective items were presented in a random order and were balanced for positively and negatively worded items. Responses were reported on a 7-point scale (1 =

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2The SDO scale used in these studies was also a multi-dimensional scale, capturing related but separate Dominance and Egalitarian motives. Given our present emphasis on (right-wing) authoritarianism, an examination of the multiple dimensions of SDO is beyond the scope of this paper. Additional analyses are available upon request.
Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree), and average scores were calculated for Authoritarianism, Conservatism, Traditionalism, and SDO.

Participants were then randomly assigned to evaluate either six left-wing or six right-wing groups (see Table 1). As in Crawford and Pilanski (2014a), half of the targets held tradition-related positions and the other half held hierarchy-related positions (see Crawford & Pilanski, 2014a for a review of evidence justifying the categorization of these targets as tradition-related and hierarchy-related). For each target, participants completed three political intolerance items drawn from the extant literature (e.g., “I believe that this group should not be allowed to hold rallies outside of government buildings”; 1 = Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014b; Marcus et al., 1995), which were used to form separate average political intolerance measures for tradition-related and hierarchy-related targets.

Participants then completed three social distance items (e.g., “How willing would you be to have a member of this group as a close personal friend”; Skitka et al., 2013) toward each target (1 = Very unwilling; 6 = Very willing), which were used to form separate average social distance measures for tradition-related and hierarchy-related targets. Participants also completed feeling thermometer ratings toward each target (0 = very cold; 100 = very warm), which were used to form separate average feeling thermometer measures for tradition-related and hierarchy-related targets. Social distance and feeling thermometer items were rescored so that higher scores indicated more prejudice. Separate measures of prejudice against tradition-related and hierarchy-related targets were formed by recoding each original scale to a scale ranging from 0 to 1, and then averaging across the social distance and feeling thermometer measures. 3

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3Social distance and feeling thermometer measures were strongly correlated with each other for both tradition-related targets ($r = .78$) and hierarchy-related targets ($r = .62$), justifying collapsing across the two measures.
On a separate page following the target evaluations, participants completed Marcus et al.’s (1995) 6-item Democratic Principles scale (e.g., “Free speech should not be guaranteed to groups who threaten to disrupt order in our society”; 1 = Strongly Disagree; 6 = Strongly Agree), which measures a dispositional tendency toward political intolerance, but does not refer to a specific target group. If Conservatism uniquely predicts such non-specific political intolerance, this would provide additional corroborative evidence that Conservatism captures the anti-democratic impulse at the heart of authoritarianism.

Lastly, participants reported their political ideology (1 = Very liberal; 7 = Very conservative), party affiliation (1 = Strong Democrat; 7 = Strong Republican), and demographic variables including gender, age, race/ethnicity, religious affiliation, education level, and socioeconomic status.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations. Table 2 reports the correlations among and descriptive statistics for the study variables. The table reports political intolerance and prejudice collapsed across target political objective (i.e., tradition- and hierarchy-related) as well as separately by target political objective. Regardless of target political objective, Authoritarianism and Conservatism were moderately and positively correlated with political intolerance, whereas Traditionalism and SDO were weakly but positively correlated with political intolerance. Prejudice was not correlated with any ACT component or SDO. Consistent with other studies using the content-controlled method (Crawford, 2014; Crawford &

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4We also assessed political engagement and the Ten Item Personality Inventory for exploratory purposes, but do not report those analyses here.
5Even when limited to self-identified liberals in the right-wing target condition, Conservatism correlated with political intolerance, \( r(83) = .28, p = .011 \).
Pilanski, 2014b), political intolerance and prejudice toward each type of target were weakly to moderately positively correlated with each other. Political ideology was strongly positively correlated with each ACT component and SDO, weakly positively correlated with political intolerance, and uncorrelated with prejudice.  

Non-specific political intolerance. Non-specific political intolerance was strongly related to all three ACT components, and weakly related to SDO (Table 2). Regressing non-specific political intolerance on the three separate ACT components and SDO revealed that Conservatism was the only ACT component that was significantly associated with non-specific political intolerance ($b = .47, SE = .07, \beta = .57, t = 6.73, p < .001$; all other $ps > .135$). Non-specific political intolerance was strongly related to political intolerance of the target groups (i.e., target political intolerance), but only weakly with prejudice toward the target groups (i.e., target prejudice), and weakly positively correlated with ideology. Together, these findings provide initial evidence that the Conservatism component of RWA uniquely captures anti-democratic sentiment.

Primary Analyses

According to the BIA model, Conservatism should have main effects on political intolerance (but not prejudice) toward both tradition- and hierarchy-related targets, and these main effects should not be qualified by interaction effects with target orientation. There should be Traditionalism $\times$ Target interactions on antipathy (i.e., political intolerance and prejudice)

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6The robust positive correlations between political ideology and each ACT dimension clearly indicate an ideological divide on each dimension. That said, Conservatism is clearly the weaker of the three. Further, regressing political ideology on Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and Traditionalism reveals that Traditionalism ($b = .68, SE = .08, \beta = .61, p < .001$) is the strongest predictor compared to Authoritarianism ($b = .40, SE = .10, \beta = .31, p < .001$) and Conservatism ($b = -.36, SE = .11, \beta = -.25, p = .001$). This finding was also replicated in Study 2, as Traditionalism ($b = .56, SE = .09, \beta = .55, p < .001$) predicted political conservatism, but Authoritarianism ($b = .17, SE = .11, \beta = .14, p = .135$) and Conservatism ($b = -.23, SE = .12, \beta = -.18, p = .058$) did not.
toward tradition-related targets, such that Traditionalism positively predicts antipathy toward tradition-threatening targets and negatively predicts antipathy toward tradition-reaffirming targets. There should be no Traditionalism × Target interactions on antipathy toward hierarchy-related targets. Further, there should be SDO × Target interactions on antipathy toward hierarchy-related targets, such that SDO positively predicts antipathy toward hierarchy-attenuating targets and negatively predicts antipathy toward hierarchy-enhancing targets. There should be no SDO × Target interactions on antipathy toward tradition-related targets.

To test these hypotheses, we conducted four separate moderated multiple regression analyses with political intolerance and prejudice toward tradition-related and hierarchy-related groups as outcome variables. In each model, target ideological orientation (0 = right-wing, 1 = left-wing) and participant ideological attitude dimensions (Authoritarianism, Conservatism, Traditionalism, and SDO, all mean-centered) were entered in Step 1, and the interactions between Target orientation and each ideological attitude dimension were entered in Step 2 (Aiken & West, 1991).

**Political intolerance.** Table 3 reports the results regarding political intolerance. For tradition-related targets, Step 1 showed the expected positive main effect of Conservatism. In Step 2, the expected Traditionalism × Target interaction emerged. Simple slopes show that as expected, Traditionalism negatively related to political intolerance of tradition-reaffirming groups ($b = -.27$, $SE = .11$, $\beta = -.33$, $t = -2.58$, $p = .011$); however, inconsistent with predictions, Traditionalism was unrelated to political intolerance of tradition-threatening groups ($b = .05$, $SE = .09$, $\beta = .06$, $t = 1.83$, $p = .610$). No other significant effects emerged.

For hierarchy-related targets, Step 1 also shows the expected positive main effect of Conservatism. There was also an unexpected positive main effect of SDO, and an unexpected
negative main effect of Traditionalism (likely a suppression effect, as Traditionalism had a positive bivariate relationship with hierarchy-related political intolerance; see Table 2). As expected, however, this SDO main effect was qualified by a marginally significant SDO × Target interaction ($p = .074$). Simple slopes show that as expected, SDO positively related to political intolerance ($b = .25, SE = .07, \beta = .28, t = 3.50, p = .001$) toward hierarchy-attenuating groups; however, inconsistent with predictions, SDO was unrelated to political intolerance of hierarchy-enhancing groups ($b = .03, SE = .10, \beta = .03, t = .33, p = .741$). No other significant effects emerged.

**Prejudice.** Table 4 reports the results regarding prejudice. Regarding tradition-related targets, there were no main effects in Step 1 except for Target, indicating that participants were more prejudiced against tradition-reaffirming than tradition-threatening targets. In Step 2, only the expected Traditionalism × Target interaction emerged. Simple slopes showed that Traditionalism positively related to prejudice toward tradition-threatening groups ($b = .11, SE = .02, \beta = .67, t = 6.49, p < .001$) and negatively toward tradition-reaffirming groups ($b = -.12, SE = .02, \beta = -.64, t = -6.39, p < .001$). For hierarchy-related groups, only a Target main effect emerged in Step 1. In Step 2, the expected SDO × Target interaction was significant. Simple slopes show that as expected, SDO positively related to prejudice toward hierarchy-attenuating groups ($b = .08, SE = .02, \beta = .41, t = 5.44, p < .001$) and negatively toward hierarchy-enhancing groups ($b = -.05, SE = .02, \beta = -.23, t = -2.56, p = .010$).

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7. Suppression clearly becomes a concern in models with intercorrelated predictors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). However, the purpose of the BIA model is to separate out contributions of SDO and individual RWA components, and is consistent with other extant approaches (Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013; Duckitt et al., 2010).

8. This Target main effect is likely attributable to the left-leaning nature of the sample (typical of Mechanical Turk samples; Berinsky et al., 2012), as the mean ideological self-placement rating ($M = 3.47$; see Table 2) was significantly lower than the midpoint on this 7-point scale, $t(330) = -5.64, p < .001$. 

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There were also unexpected Authoritarianism $\times$ Target and Traditionalism $\times$ Target interactions on prejudice toward hierarchy-related groups. Authoritarianism positively related to prejudice against hierarchy-attenuating groups ($b = .05, SE = .02, \beta = .27, t = 1.99, p = .049$) and negatively toward hierarchy-enhancing groups ($b = -.05, SE = .02, \beta = -.26, t = -2.02, p = .046$). Traditionalism significantly and negatively related to prejudice against hierarchy-enhancing groups ($b = -.04, SE = .02, \beta = -.24, t = -1.99, p = .048$), but not against hierarchy-attenuating groups ($b = .03, SE = .02, \beta = .19, t = 1.50, p = .137$).

**Examining the Consequences of Ignoring the A-C-T Distinction**

The above analyses show the importance of distinguishing between RWA components to understand the relationship between authoritarianism and political intolerance. To further illustrate this point, we regressed political intolerance of tradition-related and hierarchy-related targets on the mean-centered full RWA scale (i.e., collapsing across the components), SDO (mean-centered), and Target orientation in Step 1, and the RWA $\times$ Target and SDO $\times$ Target interactions in Step 2.

For tradition-related targets, there was a significant RWA main effect ($b = .32, SE = .06, \beta = .34, t = 5.58, p < .001$) and RWA $\times$ Target interaction ($b = .32, SE = .12, \beta = .55, t = 2.76, p = .006$), but no SDO $\times$ Target interaction ($p = .322$). Simple slopes indicated that RWA positively related to political intolerance of tradition-threatening targets ($b = .45, SE = .07, \beta = .51, t = 6.88, p < .001$), replicating Crawford and Pilanski (2014a), but also tended to positively relate to political intolerance of tradition-reaffirming targets ($b = .14, SE = .10, \beta = .13, t = 1.39, p = .166$). Recall that whereas Conservatism positively related to political intolerance toward both tradition-related targets, Traditionalism *negatively* related to political intolerance toward
tradition-reaffirming targets. Thus, the full RWA scale masks the nuanced findings from the ACT component-based analyses.

For hierarchy-related targets, there was again a significant RWA main effect ($b = .23$, $SE = .06$, $\beta = .25$, $t = 4.86$, $p < .001$), despite the fact that Conservatism was the only ACT component that positively related to political intolerance of hierarchy-related targets in the ACT component-based analyses. The remaining findings are consistent with the ACT component-based analyses: a marginally significant SDO $\times$ Target interaction ($b = .23$, $SE = .12$, $\beta = .17$, $t = 1.82$, $p = .071$) indicated that SDO positively related to political intolerance of hierarchy-attenuating targets ($b = .24$, $SE = .07$, $\beta = .26$, $t = 3.19$, $p = .002$), but was unrelated to political intolerance of hierarchy-enhancing targets ($b = .01$, $SE = .10$, $\beta = .01$, $t = .10$, $p = .922$); there was no significant RWA $\times$ Target interaction ($p = .937$).

**Discussion**

Study 1’s results provide initial support for the BIA model’s predictions. Conservatism positively related to political intolerance (but not prejudice) toward all four types of target groups. Coupled with the finding that Conservatism was uniquely associated with non-specific political intolerance, these results suggest that Conservatism captures the anti-democratic impulse at the heart of authoritarianism. Further, the effects of Traditionalism largely depended on the political objectives and orientation of the target. Consistent with predictions, Traditionalism negatively related to both forms of antipathy toward tradition-reaffirming groups, and positively related to prejudice (but unexpectedly, not political intolerance) toward tradition-threatening groups. The effects of SDO also largely conformed to predictions: SDO positively related to antipathy toward hierarchy-attenuating groups, and negatively related to prejudice (but unexpectedly, not political intolerance) toward hierarchy-enhancing groups. With the exception
of the positive effect of the Authoritarianism component on prejudice toward tradition-reaffirming targets (which we address in the Results for Study 2), none of the unexpected effects in Study 1 replicated in Study 2.

**Study 2**

Study 2 utilized a within-subjects design to examine the replicability of Study 1’s findings, which is especially important given evidence that the strength of intergroup biases is reduced in within-subjects designs relative to between-subjects designs (Crawford, Kay, & Duke, 2015), such as that used in Study 1.

**Method**

**Participants**

Two-hundred fifty-two U. S. residents (56% female; 77% White; M<sub>age</sub> = 35 years) were recruited through MTurk and were compensated 50 cents for their participation.

**Materials and Procedures**

Materials and procedures for Study 2 were identical to those of Study 1, with the exception that participants in Study 2 evaluated all twelve targets listed in Table 1. Prejudice was again computed by transforming the feeling thermometer and social distance measures to 0 to 1 scales, and averaging across the two (feeling thermometer and social distance ratings for each of the four group types were highly correlated, with r<sub>s</sub> ranging from .42 to .69). Separate measures of political intolerance and prejudice against the four types of targets (i.e., tradition-threatening, tradition-reaffirming, hierarchy-attenuating, and hierarchy-enhancing) were calculated.

**Results**

**Preliminary Analyses**
**Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations.** Table 5 reports the correlations among and descriptive statistics for the study variables. Regardless of target political objective, Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and Traditionalism were moderately and positively correlated with political intolerance, whereas SDO was weakly but positively correlated with political intolerance. Prejudice was not correlated with any ACT component or SDO. Political intolerance and prejudice were moderately positively correlated with each other. Political ideology was moderately to strongly positively correlated with each ACT component and SDO, and uncorrelated with either political intolerance or prejudice. These findings are all highly consistent with those from Study 1.

**Non-specific political intolerance.** Non-specific political intolerance was strongly correlated with all three ACT components, and only weakly with SDO. When non-specific political intolerance was regressed on each ACT component and SDO, only Conservatism significantly related to non-specific political intolerance ($b = .48, SE = .07, \beta = .57, t = 6.52, p < .001$; all other $ps > .165$). Non-specific political intolerance was strongly correlated with target political intolerance, but only weakly with target prejudice, and was unrelated to ideology. These findings fully replicate those from Study 1, showing that Conservatism captures anti-democratic sentiment independent of the targets’ political objectives.

**Primary Analyses**

According to the BIA model, Conservatism should positively predict political intolerance (but not prejudice) regardless of the target’s political orientation (i.e., left-wing or right-wing) or political objectives (i.e., tradition-related or hierarchy-related). Further, the effects of Traditionalism and SDO on antipathy (i.e., political intolerance and prejudice) should depend on target political orientation and objective, such that Traditionalism should more strongly predict
antipathy toward tradition-related groups and SDO should more strongly predict antipathy
toward hierarchy-related groups; further, these effects should be positive for left-wing groups
and negative for right-wing groups.

The bivariate correlations in Table 5 show that the ACT components and SDO were
uncorrelated with prejudice per se. However, all ACT components and SDO were correlated
with political intolerance. That said, Table 6 (Panel A) shows that after regressing target political
intolerance on each ACT component and SDO, only Conservatism significantly related to target
political intolerance. Further, Conservatism is the only ACT component that was significantly
associated with political intolerance of left-wing (Table 6, Panel B) and right-wing (Table 6,
Panel C) target groups.\textsuperscript{9} Along with findings from both studies that Conservatism uniquely
related to non-specific political intolerance, these findings offer strong support for the key BIA
model hypothesis that Conservatism uniquely captures the anti-democratic impulse at the heart
of authoritarianism.

To test the BIA model’s more specific predictions, we specified eight separate multiple
regression models, regressing political intolerance and prejudice toward each target group type
(i.e., tradition-reaffirming, tradition-threatening, hierarchy-enhancing, hierarchy-attenuating) on
each ACT component and SDO. Table 7 shows that Conservatism significantly or marginally
positively related to political intolerance toward all four targets, but did not positively relate to
prejudice toward any targets. Further, Traditionalism significantly or marginally positively
related to both forms of antipathy toward tradition-threatening targets, but significantly
negatively related to antipathy toward tradition-reaffirming targets. SDO positively related to

\textsuperscript{9}Further, even when limited to self-identified liberal participants, Conservatism was correlated with political
intolerance of tradition-reaffirming \( r(138) = .24, p = .004 \) and hierarchy-enhancing \( r(137) = .26, p = .002 \) targets,
replicating Study 1.
political intolerance and prejudice toward hierarchy-attenuating groups, and negatively related to prejudice toward hierarchy-enhancing groups. As in Study 1, SDO was unrelated to political intolerance toward hierarchy-enhancing groups.

There were a few unexpected effects, some of which were inconsistent with the differential prediction aspects of the balanced ideological antipathy model (i.e., SDO was related to antipathy toward tradition-threatening groups; Traditionalism was related to prejudice toward hierarchy-attenuating groups). There were also unexpected effects of Authoritarianism, for which we had no a priori hypotheses. Specifically, Authoritarianism was marginally or significantly related to political intolerance and prejudice toward tradition-reaffirming and hierarchy-attenuating groups. Importantly, however, because its effects were on both forms of antipathy, Authoritarianism did not differentiate between political intolerance and prejudice in the way that Conservatism did.

Examine the Consequences of Ignoring the A-C-T Distinction

We regressed political intolerance of each target group type on the composite RWA scale and SDO. Replicating Study 1, RWA significantly and positively related to political intolerance toward each target group type (all $\beta$s $>.20$, all $p$s $<.005$). Again, this finding clearly masks the nuanced findings from the ACT component-based primary analyses, which found that whereas Conservatism related to political intolerance of each target group type, Traditionalism’s effects depended on both the target’s political objective and orientation.

Discussion

Using a within-subjects design, Study 2 largely replicated the findings from Study 1, which used a between-subjects design. The Conservatism component of RWA uniquely related to political intolerance (but not prejudice) toward target groups, regardless of political orientation.
or political objective. Along with evidence that Conservatism was uniquely related to non-specific political intolerance, these findings support the key contention of the BIA model that Conservatism captures the anti-democratic impulse at the heart of authoritarianism.

Further, Traditionalism’s effect on both forms of antipathy depended on the target’s political objectives (i.e., for tradition- but not hierarchy-related groups) and orientation (i.e., positive for tradition-threatening but negative for tradition-reaffirming). The effects of SDO on antipathy were also largely differential, such that SDO positively related to both forms of antipathy toward hierarchy-attenuating groups, and negatively related to prejudice against hierarchy-enhancing groups. As in Study 1, SDO was unrelated to political intolerance of hierarchy-enhancing groups, contrary to expectations.

**General Discussion**

RWA and SDO have long been considered powerful antecedents of prejudice toward an assortment of social groups (Duckitt, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008 for a meta-analytic review). Further, whereas the relationship between SDO and political intolerance has been more tenuous (see Crawford & Pilanski, 2014a), the relationship between (right-wing) authoritarianism and political intolerance has been considered so robust (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014a; Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Frenkel-Brunswik et al., 1947) that several scholars have even used the RWA scale as a measure of political intolerance (Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005).

In this paper, we integrated several recent approaches to understanding ideological antipathy and the authoritarianism construct itself to build the balanced ideological antipathy (BIA) model. Findings from two studies (N = 585) largely supported the model. First, consistent with the ideological conflict hypothesis (ICH; Brandt et al., 2014), like political conservatism,
RWA and SDO were not related to prejudice per se. Instead, their effects depended on the political orientation of the target, and in the case of RWA, a specific component of RWA that captures the content of beliefs regarding traditional vs. progressive values (i.e., Traditionalism). Specifically, across both studies, Traditionalism was positively related to prejudice against tradition-threatening groups but negatively against tradition-reaffirming groups, whereas SDO was positively related to prejudice against hierarchy-attenuating groups but negatively against hierarchy-enhancing groups.

These findings were also generally consistent with the differential prediction hypothesis of the DPM model (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010) in that Traditionalism positively related to prejudice against tradition-threatening groups, whereas SDO positively related to prejudice against hierarchy-attenuating groups. That said, there are two important advantages that the BIA model offers over the DPM model as an integrative model of intergroup antipathy. First, because of its emphasis on prejudice toward left-wing targets groups that are socially deviant (i.e., tradition-threatening) or competitive and/or low status (i.e., hierarchy-attenuating), the DPM model cannot account for prejudice against their right-wing corollaries (i.e., tradition- and hierarchy-enhancing targets, respectively). Despite some suggestive evidence in the literature (e.g., Chambers et al., 2013), to our knowledge, the present studies are the first to show that (a component of) RWA and SDO also differentially predict prejudice against such right-wing targets.

Second, and more importantly, the BIA model accounts for the psychological distinction between negative affect toward and evaluation of a group (i.e., prejudice) and willingness to deny democratically-protected rights to that group (i.e., political intolerance). As Crawford (2014) recently demonstrated, prejudice and political intolerance are related but distinct intergroup outcomes with differential threat-based antecedents. The present studies identify
Conservatism, which captures submission to authority (Duckitt et al., 2010), as the component of the RWA construct that captures the anti-democratic impulse long considered the heart of the authoritarian syndrome (Frenkel-Brunswik et al., 1947). Specifically, Conservatism was positively associated with political intolerance, but not prejudice, regardless of the target’s political orientation (i.e., left-wing or right-wing) or political objective (tradition- or hierarchy-related). These findings were corroborated by additional evidence from both studies that Conservatism was uniquely associated with non-specific political intolerance as a general predisposition, rather than toward any particular target group. This argument is also supported by evidence from an additional validation sample (N = 182) in which Conservatism was the only significant predictor of political intolerance (but not prejudice) toward participants’ least-liked group.10

Further, these results suggest that just as with prejudice, RWA and SDO should not be considered predictors of political intolerance per se. In line with BIA model predictions, Traditionalism negatively related to political intolerance of tradition-reaffirming groups across both studies. Although the effect of Traditionalism on political intolerance of tradition-threatening groups did not reach significance in Study 1, it was significantly positively associated with political intolerance of tradition-threatening groups in Study 2. Thus, different components of RWA had opposing effects on political intolerance—whereas Conservatism clearly reflected anti-democratic sentiment towards all targets, effects of Traditionalism on political intolerance of tradition-related groups depended on the target’s political orientation.

10In an additional U. S. Mechanical Turk sample, only Conservatism predicted political intolerance (but not prejudice) toward both left-wing and right-wing least-liked groups. Unfortunately, this study could not fully test the BIA model because some targets did not neatly fit the distinction between tradition- and hierarchy-related objectives (e.g., immigrants rights activists), and participants were more likely to select tradition- than hierarchy-related targets and more likely to select right-wing than left-wing targets. We therefore do not report these results in this paper, but mention them here to highlight the replicability of the relationship between Conservatism and political intolerance. Data from this additional sample are available upon request.
SDO also had differential effects on political intolerance. Across both studies, SDO positively related to political intolerance of hierarchy-attenuating groups as expected. Contrary to predictions, SDO was unrelated to political intolerance of hierarchy-enhancing groups in either study. Instead, only Conservatism was related to political intolerance of such targets, suggesting the anti-democratic sentiment captured by Conservatism outweighs the effect of the more ideological attitude dimension of SDO for these targets.

**Recommendations**

These findings across two studies in support of the BIA model suggest three fairly strong recommendations for future research on the relationship between ideological attitudes and intergroup antipathy. First, we echo Brandt et al.’s (2014) recommendation that researchers interested in intergroup antipathy examine an array of target groups from across the political spectrum. Along with several other recent investigations (e.g., Chambers et al., 2013; Crawford, 2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014b; Iyengar & Westwood, in press; Wetherell et al., 2013), the present studies demonstrate that investigations restricted to left-wing or left-aligned target groups limit the ability to understand the nature of intergroup antipathy itself (see also Duarte, Crawford, Stern, Haidt, Jussim, & Tetlock, in press, for a discussion).

Second, researchers should take a multi-dimensional approach to understanding the relationship between authoritarianism and political intolerance. In these studies, not only was one single component of the ACT scale (Conservatism) associated with political intolerance across the political spectrum, but even more importantly, another component (Traditionalism) was negatively associated with political intolerance toward (right-wing) tradition-reaffirming groups. The results employing the full RWA scale illustrate that the failure to distinguish between components muddies conclusions regarding the very direction of “right-wing” authoritarianism’s
relationship with political intolerance. Several other researchers have highlighted the utility of
instead using authoritarian measures devoid of ideological content (e.g., child-rearing values;
Stenner, 2005; Tagar, Federico, Lyons, Ludeke, & Koenig, 2014), in large part because the
RWA scale explicitly measures attitudinal positions that lean in a particular ideological direction
rather than a disposition that can potentially characterize people across the political spectrum
(Feldman, 2003). The present results suggest that the Conservatism dimension of the ACT scale
can capture the authoritarian disposition in an ideologically balanced manner.

Third, and perhaps most controversially, these findings question the very utility and
appropriateness of the “right-wing” authoritarianism construct itself. Although Altemeyer (1996)
argued that the “right-wing” in the RWA construct referred to “psychological” rather than
“political” conservatism, many studies have used the RWA scale to predict antipathy toward left-
wing or left-aligned groups, and several researchers have treated RWA and conservatism as
synonymous (e.g., Hodson & Costello, 2007; Jost et al., 2003; Terrizzi et al., 2010). It strikes us
therefore as quite paradoxical that one component of “right-wing” authoritarianism
(Conservatism) would positively relate to political intolerance of right-wing targets, whereas the
effects of another component (Traditionalism) on political intolerance and prejudice depend on
the target’s political orientation. Advances in understanding the nature of ideological antipathy
(e.g., the ideological conflict hypothesis; Brandt et al., 2014) and in measuring authoritarianism
(e.g., the ACT scale; child-rearing values) suggest that there is more utility in focusing on the
relationship between “little a” authoritarianism and intergroup antipathy. When modern scholars
typically approach the nature of authoritarianism (sans the “right-wing” aspect), they
operationalize it as submission and conformity to legitimate collective authority at the expense of
individual needs (e.g., Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005; Tagar et al., 2014). This ideologically
value-neutral definition presents more fertile ground for the study of authoritarianism across the political spectrum than that provided by the RWA scale, and the present studies show that the Conservatism component is at least one tool to capture this tendency.

As Duarte et al. (in press) argue, the integrity of social psychological science is threatened when undue emphasis is placed on understanding one type of belief system (e.g., right-wing authoritarianism) at the expense of understanding belief systems more generally (e.g., authoritarianism). The BIA model and the supportive evidence from the present studies offer a corrective to the extant literature’s overemphasis on right-wing authoritarianism, and clarity in how to move the field forward to understanding the nature of authoritarianism itself.

In summary, we suggest that if researchers desire to understand the relationship between ideological attitudes and intergroup antipathy, and authoritarianism itself, they should a) discontinue using the various iterations of Altemeyer’s RWA scale, b) instead use multi-dimensional measures of authoritarianism (e.g., the ACT scale), child-rearing values, or other “content-free” self-report or behavioral measures, and c) examine various manifestations of antipathy toward targets from across the political spectrum.

**Limitations and Future Directions**

These studies used internet samples from a population that has been shown to roughly approximate representative samples on a number of characteristics (Berinsky et al., 2012) and to replicate many well-known lab effects (Berinsky et al., 2012; Horton et al., 2011). Nevertheless, it would be advantageous to examine the BIA model’s predictions in a nationally representative sample, such as the American National Election Survey (ANES). Whereas the ANES includes some measures that approximate Conservatism (i.e., child-rearing values), Traditionalism (i.e., moral traditionalism), and SDO (i.e., egalitarianism), it does not provide an even balance of left-
wing and right-wing targets, explicitly differentiate between tradition- and hierarchy-related targets, or assess both political intolerance and prejudice toward individual target groups. Future research should bridge this gap with representative samples.

According to the DPM model, external threats and competitive circumstances moderate the effects of RWA and SDO on intergroup attitudes, respectively. Further, perceptions of threat and competition from target groups respectively mediate the respective relationships between intergroup attitudes and RWA and SDO (see Duckitt & Sibley, 2010 for a review). Of course, these investigations have largely been limited to left-wing or left-aligned targets. Future applications of the BIA model could examine the roles of threat and competition in the relationship between ideological attitudes and antipathy toward groups from across the political spectrum, especially in experimental contexts, as the present studies were limited to correlational evidence. Recent findings from Crawford (2014) may suggest a direction forward, as abstract (i.e., symbolic) threat was associated with prejudice against a host of groups from across the political spectrum, whereas different types of tangible threats were associated with political intolerance of left-wing (safety threat) and right-wing (rights threat) activist groups.

Conclusion

In this paper, we introduced and tested the Balanced Ideological Antipathy (BIA) model, which challenges the assumption that RWA and SDO predict intergroup antipathy per se. Across two studies, we found support for the model in that the Conservatism component of RWA was positively associated with political intolerance (but not prejudice) toward various types of target groups, regardless of their political orientation or objectives. This finding indicates that the Conservatism component captures the anti-democratic impulse long-considered the heart of authoritarianism. However, the effects of the Traditionalism component of RWA and of SDO on
intergroup antipathy (e.g., prejudice and political intolerance) generally depended on target political orientation and objective. Specifically, the Traditionalism component was positively and negatively related to antipathy against tradition-threatening and -enhancing groups, respectively. SDO was positively and negatively related to prejudice against hierarchy-attenuating and -enhancing groups, respectively; whereas SDO was positively related to political intolerance of hierarchy-attenuating groups, it was not associated with political intolerance of hierarchy-enhancing groups, contrary to predictions.

While the BIA model integrates several social and political psychological perspectives on the relationship between ideological attitudes and intergroup antipathy (and produces findings largely consistent with those perspectives), none of these prior theoretical approaches alone can explain the hypothesized results that were observed in the present studies and derived from the BIA model. Together, these findings promise to advance not only our understanding of how ideological motives influence intergroup antipathy, but also the very nature of authoritarianism itself.
References


Table 1

*Target groups*

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Table 2

**Study 1: Correlations and descriptive statistics**

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*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Table 3

*Study 1: Results of moderated multiple regression analyses on political intolerance toward tradition-related and hierarchy-related groups*

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†p = .07; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Table 4

*Study 1: Results of moderated multiple regression analyses on prejudice toward tradition-related and hierarchy-related groups*

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†p = .06; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
### Table 5

**Study 2: Correlations and descriptive statistics**

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| $\alpha$ | .90 | .92 | .95 | .95 | .96 | - | - | .86 |

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001*
Table 6

*Study 2: Political intolerance regressed on ACT components and SDO*

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†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Table 7

*Study 2: Multiple regression analyses of political intolerance and prejudice toward tradition-related and hierarchy-related groups*

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\(\dagger p < .08; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001\)
Figure 1

*The Balanced Ideological Antipathy (BIA) Model*

Note: Solid lines represent relationships that are predicted to be significant; dotted lines represent relationships that are predicted to be non-significant.
Methodology File for Crawford, Mallinas, & Furman

Independent variable (RWA/ACT):

*Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements, using the 7-point scale below.*

1. It’s great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority.*
2. What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity.
3. Students at high schools and at university must be encouraged to challenge, criticize, and confront established authorities.*
4. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
5. Our country will be great if we show respect for authority and obey our leaders.
6. People should be ready to protest against and challenge laws they don’t agree with.*
7. People should be allowed to make speeches and write books urging the overthrow of the government.*
8. The more people there are that are prepared to criticize the authorities, challenge and protest against the government, the better it is for society.*
9. People should stop teaching children to obey authority.*
10. The real keys to the “good life” are respect for authority and obedience to those who are in charge.
11. The authorities should be obeyed because they are in the best position to know what is good for our country.
12. Our leaders should be obeyed without question.
13. Nobody should stick to the “straight and narrow.” Instead people should break loose and try out lots of different ideas and experiences.*
14. The “old-fashioned ways” and “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live.
15. God’s laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late.
16. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.*
17. This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol, and sex, and pay more attention to family values.
18. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.*
19. Traditional values, customs, and morality have a lot wrong with them.*
20. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.*
21. The radical and sinful new ways of living and behaving of many young people may one day destroy our society.
22. Trashy magazines and radical literature in our communities are poisoning the minds of our young people.
23. It is important that we preserve our traditional values and moral standards.
24. People should pay less attention to the bible and the other old-fashioned forms of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral.*
25. Strong, tough government will harm not help our country.*
26. Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them to take advantage of your weakness, so it’s best to use a firm, tough hand when dealing with them.
27. Our society does NOT need tougher government and stricter laws.*
28. The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down harder on troublemakers, if we are going to preserve law and order.
29. Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who deserve much better care, instead of so much punishment.*
30. The way things are going in this country, it’s going to take a lot of “strong medicine” to straighten out the troublemakers, criminals, and perverts.
31. We should smash all the negative elements that are causing trouble in our society.
32. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path.
33. People who say our laws should be enforced more strictly and harshly are wrong. We need greater tolerance and more lenient treatment for lawbreakers.*
34. The courts are right in being easy on drug offenders. Punishment would not do any good in cases like these.*
35. What our country really needs is a tough, harsh dose of law and order.
36. Capital punishment is barbaric and never justified.*

Independent variable (SDO):

Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements, using the 7-point scale below.
1. Having some groups on top really benefits everybody.
2. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
3. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be at the bottom.
4. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
5. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.*
6. No one group should dominate in society.*
7. Groups at the bottom should not have to stay in their place.*
8. Group dominance is a poor principle.*
9. We should not push for group equality.
10. We shouldn't try to guarantee that every group has the same quality of life.
11. It is unjust to try to make groups equal.
12. Group equality should not be our primary goal.
13. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.*
14. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.*
15. No matter how much effort it takes, we ought to strive to ensure that all groups have the same chance in life.*
16. Group equality should be our ideal.*

Dependent variable (Feeling thermometers):

Please use a 100 degree scale to rate the following groups. 100 means that you feel very warm toward the group—in other words, you like them quite a lot. 0 means that you feel very cold toward the group—in other words, you dislike them quite a lot. 50 means that you feel neutral about the group or that you do not feel very strongly about the group or that you do not know much about them. Slide the ruler to the appropriate number.
Dependent variable (Social distance; 6-point scale, from very unwilling to very willing):
How willing would you be to have someone from each of the following groups come work in the same place as you do?
How willing would you be to have someone from each of the following groups marry into your family?
How willing would you be to have someone from each of the following groups as a close personal friend?

Dependent variable (political intolerance; 6-point scale, from strongly disagree to strongly agree):
I think that this group should not be allowed to organize in order to influence public policy
I believe that this group should not be allowed to hold rallies outside of government buildings
I think that this group should be allowed to distribute pamphlets and other materials on local college campuses

NOTE: In Study 2, participants completed all of the dependent variables regarding the 12 groups listed below. In Study 1, participants completed the same dependent variables, but only regarding 6 groups (because they were randomly assigned to either the 6 left-wing groups or the 6 right-wing groups)

Pro-Choice Activists
Pro-Gay Rights Activists
Church-State Separation Activists
Pro-Life Activists
Anti-Gay Rights Activists
Religious Right Activists
Pro-Affirmative Action Activists
Pro-Welfare Activists
Activists for Increasing Taxes on the Wealthy
Anti-Affirmative Action Activists
Anti-Welfare Activists
Activists for Decreasing Taxes on the Wealthy